

Pilgrim Nuclear Plant

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Duxbury Clipper

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A Bleak Forecast for Pilgrim

By MARY "PIXIE" LAMPERT

Chilling facts on the probability and consequences of a terrorist attack on Pilgrim Nuclear Station were presented last week at an MIT Forum on Thursday and Congressman Delahunt's Forum in Plymouth on Sunday.

1. A federal study commissioned by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission calculated the consequences of a core melt at Pilgrim:

Fatalities within the first year: 3,000.

Injuries requiring hospitalization or other medical attention, first year: 30,000.

Cancer deaths: 23,000.

Fatal radius (miles): 20.

Injury radius (miles): 60.

2. The "spent fuel" at Pilgrim is far more dangerous than the core; and it is far more vulnerable.

The spent fuel is stored in a "swimming pool" outside primary containment. The spent fuel contains 10 times the radioactivity released from Chernobyl. If released, it would contaminate 25,000 square miles – an area three times the size of Massachusetts. There are many scenarios that could cause a spent fuel pool accident and release of its radioactivity

– terrorist targeting the pool itself from outside or inside, or simply disabling secondary support.

Yet, despite the potential of a catastrophe of historic proportions, the protection we need has not been provided:

3. Pilgrim's security personnel work 72 hour shifts – 12-hour days, 6 days a week; this guarantees worker fatigue and inattentiveness.

4. Only four National Guard personnel patrol the perimeter of the 1,600-acre site.

5. There is no protection from an air attack. The no-fly zone was eliminated. The two

interceptor jets on alert at Otis Air Base require a 10-minute response time. No no-fly zone cannot be big enough to provide effective response.

6. There is no effective protection from a sea attack either. A 1,000-yard exclusion zone will go into effect – intermittently patrolled, not made impenetrable. The Coast Guard is understaffed and cannot be counted upon to respond in time – many of the motor boats in Duxbury Harbor, for example, can cover 1,000 yards in about 1-1/2 minutes.

7. Emergency plans have not been upgraded. The state

still refuses to allow Duxbury's KI supply to be administered to us at our Reception Center. The state still refuses to recognize that our school children must be monitored for contamination at the Reception Center when evacuated; nor are there enough busses to evacuate them.

What can we do? Join the Duxbury Nuclear Advisory Committee, Pilgrim Security Watch and concerned citizens at Duxbury's Senior Center, Thursday, May 9, 7:30.

Mary "Pixie" Lampert is chairman of the Duxbury Nuclear Advisory Committee.